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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, the United States challenges the District 
Court's decision to award a group of qui tam relators 
approximately $52 million of the government's settlement 
with defendant SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories 
of a variety of claims under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
S 3729 et seq. For the reasons explained below, we reverse 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
A. In 1992, the United States began to suspect tha t 
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories ("SKB") and 
several other medical laboratories had adopted a scheme 
that allowed them to bill the federal government for 
unauthorized and unnecessary laboratory tests. 
Specifically, the government suspected that the laboratories 
had "bundled" a standard grouping of blood tests with 
some additional tests and had then marketed this grouping 
to doctors by leading them to believe that the additional 
tests would not increase costs to Medicare and other 
government-sponsored health programs. 
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After the tests were ordered, the laboratories "unbundled" 
the additional tests from the standard grouping for 
purposes of billing. In many instances, treating physicians 
had made no determination that the additional tests were 
medically necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of 
patients; instead, the physicians had ordered the tests 
solely because they were sold as a package with other tests 
that they had deemed necessary. As a result, the 
laboratories submitted bills--and received payment-- for 
tests that were medically unnecessary. 
 
This scheme, which later became known as the 
"automated chemistry" scheme, attracted national attention 
in December 1992 when one of the contractors that had 
engaged in the practice, National Health Laboratories, 
settled a lawsuit brought under the False Claims Act for 
$111 million. See Joint App. at 1432-1441. Public interest 
grew as the news media reported that the government had 
issued comprehensive subpoenas to SKB and other 
laboratories. See Joint App. at 1442-1450, 1451-1457, 
1470-1473. 
 
B. In November 1993, relator Robert Merena, an SKB 
employee, filed a qui tam action against SKB in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. His complaint contained eight separate 
claims under the False Claims Act. Merena's complaint 
alleged that SKB had defrauded the government by, inter 
alia, billing for tests that were not performed, double 
billing, paying illegal kickbacks to health care professionals, 
and adding tests to "automated chemistry" profiles and 
then separately billing for those tests. App. at 75-103. 
 
One month later, relator Glenn Grossenbacher, an 
attorney, filed a second qui tam action against SKB in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.1 
Relators Kevin Spear, Jack Dowden, and the Berkeley 
Community Law Center (collectively, "the Spear relators") 
followed in February of 1995 with a suit in the Northern 
District of California. The courts in Texas and California 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In August 1995, Dr. Charles Robinson, a former SKB medical director 
in San Antonio, joined the Grossenbacher complaint. 
 
                                5 
  
transferred these actions to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for consolidation with the Merena case. 
 
After Merena's action was filed, the government 
commenced an investigation into a series of new claims 
that were not part of its original investigation. At the same 
time, the government continued to pursue the original 
"automated chemistry" investigation that it had begun after 
the 1992 settlement with National Health Laboratories. 
 
C. In August 1995, the government began formal 
settlement negotiations with SKB. The government 
presented SKB with a written settlement framework that 
allocated a specific dollar amount for each alleged false 
claim. Joint App. at 1476-1491. 
 
By early 1996, SKB and the government had reached a 
tentative agreement to settle, for $295 million, certain 
federal and state claims for losses occurring through 
December 31, 1994. This agreement was intended to settle 
claims related to the government's original "automated 
chemistry" investigation, along with additional claims in the 
qui tam actions filed by relators Merena, Grossenbacher, 
and Spear. At a meeting on March 22, 1996, counsel for 
the United States explained to the relators the components 
of the proposed settlement. See Joint App. at 1537, 1538- 
1549. During the summer of 1996, the United States 
negotiated an additional payment from SKB of $30 million 
to resolve additional claims that arose during 1995 and 
1996. Joint App. at 859, 1223. 
 
The government formally intervened in the Merena, 
Grossenbacher, and Spear actions pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(b)(2). Soon thereafter, the District Court formally 
approved a settlement agreement between the United States 
and SKB for $325 million plus interest. See Joint App. at 
201-221. Although the False Claims Act provides a specific 
mechanism for relators to challenge the adequacy of a 
settlement agreement into which the government enters, 31 
U.S.C. S 3730(c)(2)(B), Merena, Grossenbacher, and the 
Spear relators did not challenge the overall statement. See 
Joint App. at 213. 
 
After approving the settlement agreement, the District 
Court dismissed the three qui tam actions with prejudice. 
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However, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction over, 
among other things, the "determination of the relators' qui 
tam shares." Dist. Ct. Op. At 7. See Joint App. at 198, 274- 
277. 
 
The District Court subsequently disposed of complaints 
that three other relators filed after the Merena, 
Grossenbacher, and Spear complaints. The Court analyzed 
these complaints on a claim-by-claim basis in order to 
determine whether each claim was barred under the"first- 
to-file" rule imposed by 31 U.S.C. S 3730(b)(5). The Court 
was able to identify only one claim that had not been raised 
in one of the previously filed complaints. Accordingly, the 
Court allowed that claim to survive but barred all the 
others. The later-filing relators appealed, but we affirmed 
the District Court's decision. See United States ex rel. 
LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Lab., 149 F.3d 227, 
325-36 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The government failed to reach an agreement with 
relators Merena and Grossenbacher on the amount that 
they would receive from the settlement agreement. The 
government maintained that Merena was entitled to 
approximately $10 million of the $65 million attributable to 
the non-"automated chemistry" claims and has paid 
Merena this amount. The government and the Spear 
relators have a proposed agreement that, if approved, will 
award the Spear relators 15% of the $13 million that the 
government attributed to a claim called the "CBC Indices" 
claim. 
 
D. The core of the current dispute between the Uni ted 
States and relators Merena, Grossenbacher, and Robinson 
(hereinafter "the relators") concerns the relators' right to a 
share of the settlement proceeds attributable to the 
"automated chemistry" claims. The relators argue that they 
are entitled under 31 U.S.C. S 3170(d) to a percentage of 
the total proceeds that the government obtained in the 
settlement. The government, on the other hand, maintains 
that the relators may not receive any portion of the 
proceeds attributable to the "automated chemistry" claims 
because the relators' "automated chemistry" claims were 
jurisdictionally barred under the public-disclosure provision 
of the qui tam statute, 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4) ("section 
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(e)(4)"), which provides that "[n]o court shall have 
jurisdiction" over any False Claims Act action that is "based 
upon" certain specified public disclosures unless the action 
is brought by the Attorney General or an "original source" 
of the information. The government contends that the 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
relators' "automated chemistry" claims and, accordingly, 
could not grant them any share of the settlement allocable 
to those claims. 
 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding 
this dispute. The government presented evidence 
concerning the portion of the total settlement that was 
attributable to each claim.2 The government also presented 
evidence showing that the "automated chemistry" claims 
had been under investigation, and were widely reported in 
the news media, long before any of the qui tam complaints 
were filed. Joint App. at 2159-2160, 2204. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, the District Court accepted 
the relators' position. The Court denied the government's 
motion to dismiss the relators' "automated chemistry" 
claims under 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4), noting that the qui tam 
complaints had already been dismissed with prejudice and 
"[did] not have to be re-dismissed." Dist. Ct. Op. At 36. 
Agreeing with the relators that the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction was "mooted" when the government 
formally intervened in the action, the Court declined to 
decide whether the relators' "automated chemistry" claims 
would have been subject to dismissal prior to the 
government's intervention. Id. at 36-37. 
 
The Court also rejected the government's argument that 
it was necessary to analyze the relators' complaints on a 
claim-by-claim basis in order to calculate their shares. Id. 
at 37-43. The Court observed: 
 
       The qui tam statute involved makes no mention of 
       treating a qui tam complaint as having distinct and 
       divisible claims for the purpose of determining the qui 
       tam Relator's share of the proceeds. The statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government also presented evidence that the relators had actively 
participated in the allocation process. See Joint App. at 1476-1491. 
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       provides that where the Government intervenes and 
       proceeds with the action, as it did in these cases, the 
       qui tam Relator shall "receive at least 15 percent but 
       no more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action 
       or settlement of the claim." (Underlining added). The 
       statute speaks of the action and claim as a single unit 
       or whole entity. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 38. In addition, the Court noted that the 
government had "never sought to have any of the relators' 
qui tam allegations dismissed prior to the entry of the order 
settling and dismissing each of the actions with prejudice," 
that the government had never sought leave to file an 
amended complaint, and that the Settlement Agreement 
and related filings did not break down the settlement on a 
claim-by-claim basis. Id. at 38-39. Furthermore, the Court 
stated that "[t]here [was] absolutely no evidence on the 
record . . . to establish any allocation." Id . at 41. See also 
id. at 42 ("Even if dividing the proceeds among separate 
claims would be appropriate, there is no evidence upon 
which a fact-finder could rationally make such a 
determination on the record before me.") The Court 
concluded that the relators were entitled under 31 U.S.C. 
S 3170(d) to between 15% and 25% of approximately $306 
million.3 After considering the contributions made by the 
relators, the Court decided that they should jointly receive4 
an award of 17% of the proceeds -- or more than $52 
million. Since the government had already paid Merena 
about $10 million, the Court entered an order awarding the 
relators approximately $42 million. The United States 
appealed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This sum was calculated as follows: the settlement proceeds plus 
interest (about $334 million) minus both the total paid to state Medicaid 
Fraud units (about $14.5 million) and the agreed allocation to the Spear 
relators (about $13 million). 
 
4. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether either the Merena 
or Grossenbacher complaint was barred under thefirst-to-file rule of 
S 3730(b)(5) because these relators had "agreed among themselves as to 
the division of any proceeds, regardless to whom the award or awards 
were made." Dist. Ct. Op. at 69. 
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II. 
 
This appeal requires us to decide two chief legal issues. 
The first concerns the application of the relevant provisions 
of the qui tam statute to a multi-count complaint. The 
second concerns the interpretation of section 3170(e)(4) and 
its relationship to the provision governing awards to 
relators in cases in which the United States elects to 
proceed with the action, 31 U.S.C. S 3170(d). We will 
discuss each of these issues and then apply our 
conclusions to the particular situation presented in this 
case. 
 
A. As we have previously commented, the draftsmans hip 
of the qui tam statute has its quirks, see United States ex 
rel. Mistick v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, 
186 F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 1999), and one of those quirks 
is that the statute is based on the model of a single-claim 
complaint. See id. The District Court in this case stated: "It 
would seem almost inevitable to me that at least in most 
qui tam actions there would be allegations of multiple false 
claims alleged in a complaint," Dist. Ct. Op. At 38, and we 
are inclined to agree, but the qui tam statute is phrased as 
if every qui tam complaint contained only one claim. The 
following provisions illustrate this pattern. 
 
The statute authorizes a qui tam plaintiff to bring a "civil 
action for a violation of section 3729," 31 U.S.C. S 3730 
(b)(1)(emphasis added), but surely such a plaintiff may 
bring an action containing multiple claims, each of which 
alleges a separate violation of section 3729. When a qui tam 
action is filed, the government may "proceed with the 
action," SS 3730(b)(2) and (4)(emphasis added) or "decline to 
take over the action," S 3730(b)(4)(B)(emphasis added), but 
the government often decides to take over only certain 
claims in a multi-claim action, and we are aware of no 
decision holding that this is improper. The statute 
authorizes the government to "dismiss the action" and 
"settle the action," 31 U.S.C. S 3730(c)(2)(A) and (B), but 
again, we are aware of no decision holding that the 
government may not settle or dismiss only some of the 
claims in a multi-claim complaint, and we can think of no 
reason why the government should not be permitted to do 
so. 
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Under the "first-to-file" rule of section 3730(b)(5), when a 
relator "brings an action," "no other person may . . . bring 
a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action." But as the District Court's prior rulings in this case 
illustrate, when it is asserted that a later-filed complaint 
contains claims that are based on the facts underlying 
certain claims in a pending multi-count complaint, the 
court must conduct a claim-by-claim analysis in order to 
determine if section 3730(b)(5) applies. 
 
Section 3730(e), provides that no court shall have 
jurisdiction over "an action" that falls into one of four 
categories: (1) "an action" brought by a former or present 
member of the armed forces against a member of the armed 
forces arising out the plaintiff 's military service, (2) "an 
action" against a member of Congress or the judiciary or a 
senior executive branch official if "the action" is based on 
evidence or information known to the Government, (3)"an 
action" based upon allegations or transactions that are the 
subject of a civil suit or certain administrative proceedings 
to which the government is a party, and (4) "an action" 
based on certain publicly disclosed information (unless the 
action is brought by the Attorney General or an original 
source). What happens under these provisions if a relator 
files a multi-claim suit and some, but not all, of the claims 
fall into one of these categories? The plaintiff 's decision to 
join all of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not 
rescue claims that would have been doomed by section 
(e)(4) if they had been asserted in a separate action. And 
likewise, this joinder should not result in the dismissal of 
claims that would have otherwise survived. 
 
Thus, in applying section (e)(4), it seems clear that each 
claim in a multi-claim complaint must be treated as if it 
stood alone. It follows, therefore, that in determining 
whether the relators in this case are entitled to a share of 
any proceeds that are attributable to the "automated 
chemistry" claims, we must consider whether they would 
have been entitled to such a share had their complaints 
asserted those claims alone. We now turn to that question. 
 
B. The government contends that the relators are n ot 
entitled to any share of the proceeds attributable to the 
"automated chemistry" claims because those claims are 
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based upon publicly disclosed information and fall within 
the jurisdictional bar of S 3170(e)(4). The government 
reasons as follows: the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the relators' automated chemistry claims;5 
therefore, the Court could not award them any recovery. 
 
Perhaps because the government couches its argument in 
terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court and 
the relators respond in similar terms. Both argue that any 
jurisdictional problem that might have existed with respect 
to the "automated chemistry" claims when the relators' 
complaints were originally filed was cured when the 
government elected to proceed with those claims. They note 
-- and the government does not disagree -- that the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
"automated chemistry" claims, as well as the other claims, 
once the government intervened. And the relators also rely 
on an old series of cases in our circuit,6  which they 
interpret to mean that even if a relator's claim is originally 
subject to a jurisdictional bar, intervention by the 
government cures the jurisdictional defect. The government 
replies by attempting to draw a distinction between 
jurisdiction over the automated chemistry claims as 
prosecuted by the United States on its own behalf after 
intervention (which the government agrees the District 
Court had) and jurisdiction over those same claims as they 
concerned the relators after intervention (which the 
government strenuously contends the District Court 
lacked). According to the government, the District Court's 
lack of the second type of jurisdiction mandated the 
dismissal of the relators as parties with respect to the 
automated chemistry claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Section 3730(e)(4) is framed in jurisdictional terms, the 
Seventh Circuit has suggested that it does not really concern subject 
matter jurisdiction. See United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 
97 
F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1996). For the reasons explained in the text, we 
find it unnecessary to resolve this question. 
 
6. In chronological order they are: United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. 
Brooks, 58 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1945); United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. 
Brooks, 154 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1946); United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. 
Brooks, 110 F. Supp. 175 (D.N.J. 1953); United States ex rel. Bayarsky 
v. Brooks, 210 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1954). 
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We do not agree with the parties that the relators' right 
to a share of the automated chemistry proceeds turns on a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction.7  Suppose that the 
government is right that the District Court should have 
dismissed the relators as parties with respect to the 
automated chemistry claims. It would not necessarily follow 
that the relators could not be awarded a share of the 
automated chemistry proceeds. Congress may enact a 
statute providing for the payment of a reward or bounty to 
a non-party who assists the government's enforcement 
efforts. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. S 78u-1. Similarly, suppose that 
the relators are right that the government's intervention 
cured any prior jurisdictional defect and that the District 
Court properly refused to dismiss the relators as parties 
with respect to the automated chemistry claims. It would 
not necessarily follow that the relators are entitled to a 
share of the proceeds. Clearly, Congress need not provide 
for such relators to obtain a portion of the proceeds just 
because they remain parties. 
 
The relevant question is not one of jurisdiction but 
simply whether the qui tam statute authorizes an award 
when a relator asserts a claim that is subject to dismissal 
under S 3170(e)(4) but the government intervenes before the 
claim is dismissed. In order to analyze this question it is 
necessary to examine both section 3730(e)(4) and section 
3730(d). 
 
Section 3730(e)(4) provides as follows: 
 
       (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an actio n 
       under this section based upon the public disclosure of 
       allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
       administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
       administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
       report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the 
       news media, unless the action is brought by the 
       Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 
       an original source of the information. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although Section 3730(e)(4) is framed in jurisdictional terms, the 
Seventh Circuit has suggested that it does not really concern subject 
matter. 
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       (B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original s ource" 
       means an individual who has direct and independent 
       knowledge of the information on which the allegations 
       are based and has voluntarily provided the information 
       to the Government before filing an action under this 
       section which is based on the information. 
 
Thus, if a relator who is not an "original source" asserts a 
claim based upon one of the types of public disclosure 
specified in this provision8 and the government does not 
intervene, the claim must be dismissed, and the relator 
obviously receives no award. This provision does not 
expressly address the question whether such a relator is 
entitled to an award if the government intervenes before the 
relator's claim is dismissed -- although it certainly counsels 
in favor of skepticism about a relator's ability to get an 
award under those circumstances. 
 
Other sections of the qui tam statute deal directly with 
awards to relators. Under section 3730(d)(2), if the 
government does not intervene, a relator is entitled to 25- 
30% of the proceeds. But if the government intervenes (and 
thus takes on the primary burden of prosecuting the 
action), the share to which the relator is entitled is reduced 
as specified in section 3730(d)(1). This provision states in 
pertinent part: 
 
       If the Government proceeds with an action brought by 
       a person under subsection (b), such person shall, 
       subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, 
       receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 
       percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of 
       the claim, depending upon the extent to which the 
       person substantially contributed to the prosecution of 
       the action. Where the action is one which the court 
       finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific 
       information (other than information provided by the 
       person bringing the action) relating to allegations or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In United States ex rel. Mistick v. Housing Authority of the City of 
Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d at 385-89, we held that a claim is "based upon" a 
public disclosure if it is based upon information contained in such a 
disclosure, whether or not the relator actually relied upon that 
disclosure. 
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       transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative 
       hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 
       Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, 
       or investigation, or from the news media, the court may 
       award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no 
       case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into 
       account the significance of the information and the role 
       of the person bringing the action in advancing the case 
       to litigation. Any payment to a person under thefirst or 
       second sentence of this paragraph shall be made from 
       the proceeds. 
 
The parties in this appeal differ sharply regarding the 
types of cases that fall within the various recovery ranges. 
The government, as previously noted, takes the position 
that a relator who asserts a claim that is subject to 
dismissal under section 3730(e)(4) is not entitled to any 
award even if the government intervenes. Thus, the 
government's view is that section 3730(d)(1) has no 
application in such a case. If the government's view is 
accepted, we believe that the permissible ranges of recovery 
for various types of cases is captured by the following table: 
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TABLE A 
 
Relator's Share Types of Cases 
15-25%          1. relator brings an action tha t is 
                not "based upon" publicly disclosed 
                information 
                2. "original source" brings an action 
                that is "based upon" but not 
                "primarily based" on publicly 
                disclosed information 
                3. "original source" brings an action 
                that is "primarily based" on publicly 
                disclosed information, but the 
                "original source" provided the 
                information 
 ó 10%            "original source" brin gs an action 
                that is "primarily based" on 
                publicly disclosed information, and 
                "original source" did not provide 
                that information  
 0%             relator brings an action that is 
                subject to dismissal under 
                S 3730(e)(4) 
   
 
The relators read sections 3730(e)(4) and 3730(d) quite 
differently. As already mentioned, they contend that section 
3730(e)(4) does not preclude an award where a relator 
asserts a claim that is subject to dismissal under that 
section but the government intervenes before the claim is 
dismissed. The award in such a case consequently would 
be governed by Section 3730(d). If the relators' position is 
accepted, we believe that the permissible recovery ranges 
for the various types of cases would be as follows: 
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TABLE B 
 
Relator's Share Types of Cases 
 15-25%         1. relator brings an action that is 
                not "based upon" publicly disclosed 
                information 
                2. relator brings an action that is 
                "based upon" but not "primarily 
                based" upon publicly disclosed 
                information 
                3. relator brings an action that is 
                "primarily based" upon publicly 
                disclosed information but relator 
                provided the information 
 ò 10%          relator brings an action that is 
                "primarily based" upon publicly 
                disclosed information, and the 
                relator did not provide the 
                information 
   
 
We find the government's position much more 
persuasive. Under this view, sections 3730(e)(4) and 
3730(d)(1) provide a descending scale of recovery ranges 
that are proportional to the public service provided by the 
relators. The highest range (15-25%) is reserved for the 
relators who provide the greatest public service-- relators 
whose claims are not "based upon" a public disclosure and 
most relators who qualify as "original sources." The lesser 
range (up to 10% of the proceeds) is provided for the 
(presumably unusual) cases in which an "original source" 
relator asserts a claim that is "primarily based" on 
information that has been publicly disclosed and that the 
relator did not provide. 
 
In contrast with the government's position, the relators' 
position produces results that we do not think that 
Congress intended. First, this interpretation provides a 
potentially huge windfall -- 15-25% of the total recovery -- 
for most relators whose claims would have been dismissed 
under section 3730(e)(4) if the government had not 
intervened. It is hard to see why Congress might have 
wanted the fortuity of government intervention to make 
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such a difference -- or why Congress might have wanted to 
provide such a large reward to such a relator, who provides 
little if any public service. See Federal Recovery Service, Inc. 
v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(describing a similar interpretation as "ignor[ing] the False 
Claims Act's goal of preventing parasitic suits based on 
information discovered by others" and as requiring awards 
in "even those [suits] brought by individuals who discovered 
the defendant's fraud by reading about it in the morning 
paper"). 
 
Second, the relators' interpretation prescribes the same 
range of awards -- 15-25% -- for two very dissimilar groups 
of relators: first, those relators who provide a substantial 
public service by bringing claims that are not based upon 
publicly disclosed information and, second, relators who 
furnish little if any public service because their claims are 
"based upon" publicly disclosed information 9 and would 
have been dismissed under section 3730(e)(4) if the 
government had not intervened. It seems unlikely that 
Congress wanted these two vastly different types of relators 
to be treated the same. 
 
Third, the relators' interpretation treats original-source 
relators the same as other relators whose claims are based 
on publicly disclosed information. Under the relators' 
interpretation, if a relator's claim is "based upon" (but not 
"primarily based" upon) publicly disclosed information, the 
relator is entitled to 15-25% regardless of whether the 
relator is an original source. Since Congress took pains in 
section 3730(e)(4)(B) to provide special, favorable treatment 
for original-source relators, it seems unlikely that Congress 
wanted a relator's original-source status to be irrelevant in 
determining the award that a relator receives in a case in 
which the government intervenes. 
 
The legislative history also supports the government's 
view. As Table A illustrates, under the government's 
interpretation, the 0% - 10% range applies only when an 
"original source" brings a claim that is "primarily based" on 
publicly disclosed information and the "original source" did 
not provide that information. By contrast, as previously 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. But not "primarily based" upon such information. 
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noted, under the relators' view, this range is not restricted 
to "original-source" relators. In discussing the provision of 
S 3730(d) creating the 0% - 10% range, two of the primary 
sponsors of the 1986 False Claims Act amendments 
described the cases to which this range would apply, and 
both stated clearly that this range would apply only to 
"original sources." Senator Grassley stated: 
 
       When the qui tam plaintiff brings an action based on 
       public information, meaning he is an "original source" 
       within the definition under the act, but the action is 
       based primarily on public information not originally 
       provided by the qui tam plaintiff, he is limited to a 
       recovery of not more than 10 percent. In other words a 
       10-percent cap is placed on those "original sources" who 
       bring cases based on information already publicly 
       disclosed where only an insignificant amount of that 
       information stemmed from that original source.  
 
132 Cong. Rec. 28580 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, Representative Berman commented: 
 
       The only exception to [the] minimum 15% recovery is 
       in the case where the information has already been 
       disclosed and the person qualifies as an "original 
       source" but where the essential elements of the case 
       were provided to the government or news media by 
       someone other than the qui tam plaintiff. 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 29322 (1986). These statements provide 
strong support for our interpretation of SS 3730(d)(1) and 
(e)(4). 
 
For all these reasons, we conclude that a relator whose 
claim is subject to dismissal under section 3730(e)(4) may 
not receive any share of the proceeds attributable to that 
claim. 
 
III 
 
Thus far, we have concluded that the relators' share of 
the proceeds must be based on a claim-by-claim analysis 
and that the relators are not entitled to any share of the 
settlement attributable to claims that would have been 
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subject to dismissal under section 3730(e)(4) prior to the 
government's intervention. These holdings do not 
necessarily dictate reversal, however, becaue the District 
Court also held (a) that the government waived its right to 
argue that the relators were not entitled to recover a share 
of the proceeds attributable to the "automated chemistry" 
claims and (b) that the government did not offer sufficient 
evidence to establish the share of the proceeds attributable 
to those claims. We now consider those issues. 
 
A. The District Court held that, when the governme nt 
agreed to settle the lawsuit, it waived its right to argue that 
the relators were barred from recovering proceeds 
attributable to the automated chemistry claims. Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 36-37. We disagree. 
 
The settlement agreement between the government and 
SKB did not dispose of any issues pertaining to the relators' 
share of the settlement proceeds. The agreement expressly 
stated that the parties would "request" that the District 
Court "specifically retain jurisdiction with respect to any 
unresolved issues, including . . . relators' share of the 
settlement proceeds." Joint App. at 214. The Court's order 
dismissing the actions stated: "this Court retains 
jurisdiction over . . . determination of . . . relators' share 
issues." Joint App. at 198. Therefore, by its own terms, the 
settlement agreement preserved the government's right to 
contest the issue of the relators' share. Accordingly, we 
hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
government waived its right to argue that the relators were 
barred from recovering proceeds attributable to the 
automated chemistry claims. 
 
B. The District Court also held that it had no fac tual 
basis upon which to determine the percentage of the 
settlement that was attributable to the automated 
chemistry claims. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 41 ("[T]here is 
absolutely no evidence on the record before me . . . to 
establish any allocation among various claims."). The 
District Court blamed the supposed dearth of evidence on 
the government, suggesting that the government refused to 
provide any meaningful response to the relators' discovery 
requests concerning the factual basis for its allocation of 
the settlement proceeds. Id. at 42-43. 
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The District Court's conclusion is not supported by the 
record. The record shows that the government produced 
substantial evidence related to the allocation of the 
settlement proceeds. During an evidentiary hearing before 
the District Court, the government introduced a series of 
documents--created during the government's negotiations 
with SKB--that specified the amount of money the 
government had demanded for each alleged violation of the 
False Claims Act. See Joint App. at 1474, 1475-1491. 
These documents showed that approximately $241 million 
were attributable to the automated chemistry claims. The 
relators, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence. 
By declining to present evidence contradicting the 
government's allocation of the settlement proceeds, the 
relators effectively gave up their right to challenge the 
factual basis of that allocation. 
 
Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the 
government submitted sufficient evidence to enable the 
District Court to allocate the settlement proceeds on a 
claim-by-claim basis. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court's finding--i.e., that there was"no evidence" 
upon which to determine the percentage of the settlement 
that was attributable to the automated chemistry claims-- 
was clearly erroneous.10 
 
IV. 
 
It is beyond dispute that, under our circuit's 
interpretation of Section 3730(e)(4) in Mistick , 186 F.3d at 
385-89, the relators' automated chemistry claims were 
"based upon" a public disclosure specified in that provision. 
See Joint App. at 1432-1441,1442-1450, 1451-1457, 1470- 
1473; 1492-1498. As we explained above, relators who 
bring such a claim cannot recover any proceeds 
attributable to that claim unless they qualify as original 
sources of information under section (e)(4)(B). The District 
Court therefore erred in allowing the relators to recover 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We make no determination with respect to the exact percentage of 
the settlement that must be attributed to the automated chemistry 
claims; we simply hold that the District Court had an adequate factual 
basis for making such a finding. 
 
                                21 
  
proceeds attributable to the "automated chemistry" claims 
without determining whether the relators were "original 
sources." 
 
On remand, the District Court must determine whether 
the relators were "original sources" of information--as 
defined by section (e)(4)(B)--with respect to the "automated 
chemistry" claims. If the District Court determines that 
they were original sources of information, it may award 
them a share of the proceeds and will have to determine 
whether they fall within the 15-25% range or the 0-15% 
range as set out in Table A supra.11 However, if the District 
Court determines that the relators were not original sources 
of information with respect to those claims, it may not 
award them any share of the proceeds attributable to them. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court 
erred in awarding the relators 17% of the settlement 
proceeds. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We express no view as to whether the Court may properly award any 
recovery jointly to the pertinent relators, or whether it must specify 
each 
relator's award. Consideration of this issue would be premature until (a) 
it is determined under the correct legal standard that a relators' award 
is appropriate and (b) the issue is properly brought before us by a party 
with standing. 
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